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In December 1946 - at the first post-war Zionist Congress in Basle -
David Ben Gurion assumed the defense portfolio, including
responsibility for the Haganah, which at the time concentrated on the
struggle against the British.
Although British restrictions, searches and detentions made the building
of a clandestine force - with armor and artillery, air and sea power -
well-nigh impossible, Ben-Gurion decided early on that this was the
decisive task: to build up a force in preparation for an assault by the
regular armies of the Arab countries, which the yishuv would have to
face alone, without outside help.
He found the Haganah woefully ill prepared for such an eventuality and
set about energetically to rectify this. Since import and deployment of
heavy weapons were not practicable as long as the British held sway
over Palestine, it was decided that manpower should be readied in the
country and equipment purchased abroad - to be "married" in time to
throw back an Arab assault, if not to prevent it; in time for 15 May 1948,
the day envisaged for the termination of the British Mandate and the
day after Israel would declare its independence.
The War of Independence (1947-49)
The war was fought along the entire, long border of the country: against
Lebanon and Syria in the north; Iraq and Transjordan - renamed Jordan
during the war - in the east; Egypt, assisted by contingents from the
Sudan - in the south; and Palestinians and volunteers from Arab
countries in the interior of the country.
It was the bloodiest of Israel's wars. It cost 6,373 killed in action (from
pre-state days until 20 July 1949) almost 1% of the yishuv (the Jewish
community) - although that figure includes quite a number of new
immigrants and some foreign volunteers.
In the First Phase (29 November 1947 - 1 April 1948), it was the
Palestinian Arabs who took the offensive, with the help of volunteers
from neighboring countries; the yishuv had little success in limiting the
war - it suffered severe casualties and disruption of passage along most
of the major highways.
In the Second Phase (1 April - 15 May) the Haganah took the initiative,
and in six weeks was able to turn the tables - capturing, inter alia, the
Arab sections of Tiberias, Haifa and later also Safed and Acre,
temporarily opening the road to Jerusalem and gaining control of much
of the territory alotted to the Jewish State under the UN Resolution.
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The Third Phase (15 May - 19 July), considered the critical one, opened
with the simultaneous, coordinated assault on the fledgling state by five
regular Arab armies from neighboring countries, with an overwhelming
superiority of heavy equipment - armor, artillery and airforce.
On 31 May the Haganah was renamed the "Israel Defence Forces". The
IDF suffered initial setbacks, including the loss of the Etzion Bloc in
Judea, the area of Mishmar Hayarden in the north and Yad Mordehai in
the south, but after three weeks was able to halt the offensive, to
stabilize the front and even initiate some local offensive operations.
The Fourth Phase (19 July 1948 - 20 July, 1949) was characterized by
Israeli initiatives: Operation Yoav, in October, cleared the road to the
Negev, culminating in the capture of Be'er Sheva; Operation Hiram, at
the end of October, resulted in the capture of the Upper Galilee;
Operation Horev in December 1948 and Operation Uvda in March 1949,
completed the capture of the Negev, which had been alotted to the
Jewish State by the United Nations.
Simultaneously, the Arab countries signed Armistice Agreements: first
came Egypt - 24 February 1949; followed by Lebanon - 23 March;
Jordan - 3 April; and Syria - 20 July. Only Iraq did not sign an armistice
agreement with Israel. It preferred to withdraw its troops and hand over
its sector to the Arab Legion of Jordan.
In the end Israel not only ejected the invading Arab forces - it also
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In the end Israel not only ejected the invading Arab forces   it also
captured and held some 5,000 km
2 over and above the areas allocated
to it by the United Nations.
In the middle of the War of Independence, the IDF was born, not on 15
May, but two weeks later; for two more weeks Ben-Gurion negotiated
with the "dissident" armed organizations, the Etzel and Lehi, convincing
them to disband voluntarily before he disbanded them in the Order of
the Establishment of the IDF on 31 May 1948. That order provided for
only one armed force, subordinate to the constitutional government.
There was complete continuity between the Haganah and the IDF:
Ya'acov Dori, the Chief of Staff; the members of the General Staff; the
commanders from brigade-level downwards - all were automatically
confirmed in their appointments.
At the end of the war the IDF had over 100,000 full-time men and
women in uniform, as compared to the mere handful of full-time soldiers
at its beginning. In addition to 12 brigades, mostly infantry, it had
several regiments of artillery. The first armored regiments were
equipped with light armored vehicles, some captured, some
"requisitioned" from the departing British troops; and a few tanks - two
Cromwells "bought" from the withdrawing British and some reconstituted
from American scrap.
The Navy consisted at first of reconverted illegal immigrant vessels.
There were the elements of an Air Force - Spitfires and
Messerschmidts, acquired mainly in Czechoslovakia, in addition to the
light civilian planes which the Haganah had used for reconnaissance
and communications purposes. Some World War II US war surplus
bombers were bought as scrap. These carried out their first "strategic
attack" on Cairo, en route to Israel, even before reaching their
homebase. Armed with a Baedeker tourist guide, one of them bombed
and strafed Abdeen Palace: rudimentary, to be sure, but entirely
unexpected and, therefore, psychologically effective.
As soon as the armistice agreements were signed and the immediate
danger had passed, the IDF - except for a small nucleus - was not only
demobilized, but effectively disbanded. The new state had urgent tasks
which required all its resources, above all that of absorbing the flood of
new immigrants, who at last were able to come "home". An attempt to
keep the demobilized soldiers in some sort of reserve framework failed.
However, for the time being there was little inclination on the Arab side
to renew full-scale fighting. Not that they had come to face reality and
recognized Israel - far from it; but they did realize that to fight against
Israel required thorough preparation.
In the meantime they found what was considered a perfect tool to show
their own people that the war was not over yet and at the same time
both to harrass Israel and embarrass her. Palestinian fedayun (suicide
troops) infiltrated across the long and ill-protected border - and it should
be recalled that no place in Israel was far from the border: infiltrations
for the purpose of stealing farm equipment were followed by the laying
of mines, the killing of individuals, and wholesale massacres. The
fedayun were trained, equipped and paid for by Egyptian Intelligence,
although they operated mainly from bases in Jordan, so that Jordan
would bear the brunt of Israel's retaliation, which inevitably followed.
And each time Israel retaliated, the Security Council condemned it;
condemnation of an Arab government had long since become an
impossibility, because of the Soviet veto.
The infiltrations - however painful, militarily and diplomatically - were no
more than a diversion from the main concern of the IDF: preparations for
the second round.
Yigael Yadin, who had taken over from Ya'akov Dori as Chief of the
General Staff, devoted his energy to organizing the reserves and
streamlining the command structure - elements of which remain in effect
to this day. At the same time, particular attention was paid to the
development of armor. Israel's numerical inferiority to its neighbors and
potential enemies; its realization that because of the lack of strategic
depth it was bound to transfer fighting as soon as possible to enemy
territory and its proven advantage at swift, often improvised manoeuvers
- all pointed to the need for armor. The newly found alliance with France
at the time of the Suez crisis provided the unique opportunity to equip a
major part of the IDF with French-made tanks. This "miracle" occurred at
a moment of desperation, when no other country, East or West, was
willing to supply Israel with arms, whereas countries from both East and
West rushed to offer their wares to the Arabs. Particularly worrisome
was the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, which threatened Israel with a
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The Sinai Campaign of 1956 (Operation Kadesh)
In a swift, sweeping operation of 100 hours, under the leadership of
then Chief of the General Staff, Moshe Dayan, the entire Sinai
peninsula fell into Israeli hands, at a cost of 231 soldiers killed. Reserve
units, about which many misgivings had been uttered before the war,
conducted themselves honorably. A reserve brigade, equipped with
requisitioned civilian buses, negotiated the difficult desert track and
captured Sharm e-Sheikh at the southernmost tip of the Sinai peninsula.
The Air Force was still deficient; its development was one of the lessons
learned from that war; armor had proven its ability and was there to
stay. If 1948 was undoubtedly the War of the Infantry, the uncontested
queen of the battlefield in the war of 1956 was Armor.
Once more Israel gained a breathing space of about ten years. Attention
now turned to the north, where the Syrians - since 1953 - had been
attempting to thwart Israel's National Water Project. Having failed, they
undertook to divert the headwaters of the Jordan (originating in Syria),
by a manouever designed to leave Israel high and dry. Water is a
classical reason for war in the Middle East ; but a brief, resolute
employment of artillery and tanks prevailed on the Syrians to refrain
from their spiteful exercise.
Although Israel had been compelled to withdraw from Sinai without any
security guarantee, UNEF - the United Nations Emergency Force, was
established to guard against a recurrence of past events. As a result the
fedayun ceased to exist. On the other hand, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), was reorganized and its principal military arm, the
Fatah - one of a confusing array of para-military and terrorist
organizations - began operations on 1 January 1965, at first from across
the Lebanese border. Never an existential threat to Israel, it was a
constant nuisance from there on and a temptation to divert attention and
energy from the main task, preparations for yet another round.
 
 
 
 
 
Egyptian planes
destroyed by the
Israel Air Force
(June 1967)
 
The Six-Day War (June 1967)
The year 1967 began with confident predictions that it would not bring
war. Nasser, it was argued in Israel, had learned the lesson of 1956 and
would not start a war unless he was ready. In any case, his relations
with Jordan were notoriously bad and a coalition between Nasser and
King Hussein was out of the question. In quick succession, events gave
the lie to these predictions. A clash in the air, in which Syria - Russia's
closest ally in the Middle East - lost 13 planes, provided the opening
signal. As a result of Soviet prodding, Nasser mobilized and sent
100,000 troops to Sinai. He demanded that the Secretary General of the
United Nations withdraw UNEF forthwith, and - probably to his own
surprise - succeeded immediately and the "firemen" departed. Then
Nasser announced the closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping -
a clearcut casus belli. He ended by taunting Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's
Chief of Staff: "Let him come, I'm waiting." Meanwhile he succeeded in
bringing about close coordination with the Syrian army. King Hussein, in
an abrupt about-face, flew to Egypt and signed an agreement placing
his forces under overall Egyptian comand. It was to cost him half his
kingdom.
Israel, its reserves fully mobilized, its nerves taut to the snapping point,
waited for three long weeks. The situation seemed the reverse of 1956;
Israel was alone, against a powerful Arab coalition. The Big Powers,
vague promises notwithstanding, did nothing to reopen the Straits and
Israel decided to go it alone.
On 5 June 1967 a cluster of planes flying from Egypt to Israel was seen
on King Hussein's radar screen. Convinced by the Egyptians that the
planes were theirs, he promptly gave the order to attack - in Jerusalem!
In fact the planes were Israel's, returning from their devastating attack
against the Egyptian airforce, which surprisingly had been taken by
surprise; after taunting Rabin, Egypt was not ready when he came.
 
Within the brief span of six days, the IDF overran the whole Sinai
peninsula, up to the Suez Canal; took the entire West Bank of the River
Jordan; and in the last days without the benefit of surprise captured a
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Jordan; and in the last days, without the benefit of surprise, captured a
great part of the Golan Heights, including the dominant Mount Hermon -
from then on "the eyes and ears of Israel". The culminating event was
the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem and the re-encounter with the
place most revered by Jews, the Western (Wailing) Wall. The blowing of
the shofar at the Western Wall reverberated throughout the world.
776 Israeli soldiers fell in the Six-Day War.
Whilst all branches of the service had performed well, the Air Force had,
for the first time, played a decisive role: clearing the skies at the outset
made all that followed possible. This was the War of the Air Force.
 
    
Diplomatic efforts to bring to an end the by-now 40 years of conflict,
which predated the establishment of Israel by more than two decades,
came to nought. In November 1967, after months of deliberations, the
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, calling for peace
and recognition of the "right of every nation to live free from threat within
secure and recognized boundaries", in return for Israel's withdrawal
"from territories", not "all the territories", nor "the territories captured in
the course of the recent hostilities". However, the Arab League, in its
session in the Sudan (1967) adopted a different resolution, the "Three
No's" of Khartoum: No peace, No negotiations, No recognition of Israel.
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The War of Attrition (1968-70)
Soon after hostilities came to a halt, President Nasser embarked on
what was to be a bloody, lengthy and inconclusive war: the War of
Attrition - a static exchange of artillery fire along the entire Bar Lev line
on the Suez Canal, which escalated rapidly. The IDF engaged in a
number of daring raids - the most spectacular was probably the capture
and safe transportation to Israel of a complete Russian-made radar
installation in good working order. When the Israel Air Force began its
bombing attacks against targets in Egypt's depth, Nasser in desperation
turned to the Soviet Union to provide Egypt not only with Russian
equipment - but also with Russian air and ground troops. Russia
reluctantly agreed. Soon afterwards the US, afraid that Big-Power direct
involvement would escalate into nuclear confrontation, agreed with the
USSR to put an end to the war under the "cease-fire stand-still" formula
of the Security Council (July 1970). 1,424 soldiers were killed in action
between 15 June 1967 and 8 August 1970.
 
    
The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was at first considered by
leaders of the PLO as ideal for armed resistance, i.e. terrorist activities.
The terrorist attacks failed, however, to have a significant impact. Arab
terrorist organisations therefore transferred their activities abroad:
kidnapping and hijacking planes and blowing them up. At first
benevolently neglected by the Western Powers - after all, they
concerned only Israel - the terror acts increased in number and
importance. The terrorists' most spectacular and bloody operation was
the massacre of 11 Israeli sportsmen in Munich, at the Olympic Games
of 1972.
Meanwhile Egypt, in secret coordination with Syria, prepared for
another round. Israel was aware of these preparations, but wed to its
concept that President Sadat of Egypt would not embark on war unless
he had achieved at least parity, if not superiority in the air, ignored the
writing on the wall.
 
 
 
The Yom Kippur War (October 1973)
The war was so called because it started on the holiest day in the
Jewish calendar, the Day of Atonement (October 6, 1973). It came
almost as a complete surprise and warning notice was given too late for
an orderly call-up of the reserves before zero hour.
The Egyptians and the Syrians made some significant initial gains: the
former crossed the Suez Canal and established themselves along its
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former crossed the Suez Canal and established themselves along its
entire length on the east bank; the latter overran the Golan Heights and
came within sight of the Sea of Galilee. However, the wheel turned very
quickly. Counterattacking swiftly, sometimes even foolhardily, within a
few days the IDF was on the west bank of the Suez Canal, at a distance
of 100 kms from the Egyptian capital, Cairo, and within artillery range of
the airfields around the Syrian capital, Damascus.
Egypt, which at first had refused a cease-fire, now accepted it avidly, as
did Syria. Considering the adverse initial circumstances, the speed and
the thoroughness with which the IDF had been able to reverse its
fortunes was remarkable. Yet the Yom Kippur War went down in Israel's
history as a qualified failure.The surprise rankled; and the cost was
heavy: 2,688 soldiers fell.
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Intelligence was faulted for failing to sound the alarm in time - the Chief
of Staff, David (Dado) Elazar and his Chief of Intelligence had to resign.
Too many airplanes were lost to Russian-made SAM-missiles. Some
experts reached the sweeping conclusion that the tank had seen its
day, in view of its vulnerability to Sagger missiles and infantry-operated
RPGs. Of 265 Israeli tanks in the first echelon, only 100 survived.
The branch that distinguished itself during the Yom Kippur War was the
Navy, which only now came of age: without a single loss of its own, it
had sunk 34 enemy vessels; had secured the coasts of the country; and
had succeeded in restricting the enemy to his bases. This was indeed
the Navy's War.
 
    
The IDF deterrent capacity had been weakened as a result of the war. It
was, however, partially restored in a spectacular and successful
operation: the Entebbe Raid of 1976 - renamed Operation Jonathan,
after the young commander of the ground forces who was its only
military casualty. The Jewish and Israeli passengers of a hijacked Air
France liner - carefully selected by the hijackers - were rescued from
the hands of a German group of terrorists, in far-away Uganda. The
resourcefulness and daring of the operation - down to transportation by
plane of a black Mercedes of the sort used by Uganda's dictator, to
confuse the enemy - aroused the imagination of the world.
The Yom Kippur War was followed by a series of Separation-of-Forces
Agreements with Egypt and Syria. These envisaged a strip of territory in
which no troops would be allowed, backed by another strip, where the
presence of troops was carefully restricted.
The agreement with Syria is still in force and UNDOF, the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force, is still there to supervise its
implementation. The agreement with Egypt has been replaced - after
lengthy negotiations which began with the dramatic visit to Jerusalem of
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (November 1977) - by the Egypt-Israel
Peace Treaty of 1979, the first to be signed between Israel and one, the
most important, of its Arab neighbors. It was based on the withdrawal of
Israel from the whole of the Sinai peninsula and its demilitarization in
return for full recognition of Israel by Egypt and establishment of
embassies and full trade and tourist relations.
The Palestinian terrorist organisations again came to the fore. They
were able to establish their bases in Lebanon. Not that Lebanon was
more hostile to Israel than other Arab countries, on the contrary; but the
central government of Lebanon was too weak to prevent the
establishment of "a state within a state". After a particularly bloody
terrorist raid on two civilian passenger buses travelling on the coastal
road near Tel Aviv, which resulted in 37 killed and 76 wounded (March
1978), the IDF undertook a swift operation: Operation Litani (March
1978) against terrorist bases in Lebanon. Its impact, however, did not
last very long.
Operation Peace for Galilee (1982)
In June 1982 a Palestinian terrorist group led by Abu Nidal carried out
an assassination attempt on Israel's Ambassador to Great Britain,
Shlomo Argov (which has left him crippled and hospitalized ever since).
In retaliation, the IDF attacked Lebanon once again and succeeded in
its original purpose to wipe out terrorist bases in the south of Lebanon.
A series of simultaneous, amphibious operations was remarkably
successful. Subsequently, however, the mission was enlarged and the
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failed to achieve its ultimate purpose. A peace treaty with Lebanon was
signed, but not ratified; the Christian government of fragmented
Lebanon was too weak to prevail.
 
   
For a short period (7 -11 June 1982) the Syrians were involved in the
war. not on the Golan Heights where the disengagement agreement
was kept to the letter, but in Lebanon itself, where the Syrians had a
considerable expeditionary force. The ground fighting against the
Syrians did not go well for the IDF and the mission of neutralizing the
Syrians and cutting off the Beirut-Damascus highway was accomplished
at a high price. Not so the battle for control of the skies: of 19 Syrian
batteries - Russian-made SAMs 2, 3 and 6 deployed in Lebanon - 14
were destroyed and four more damaged; the Syrian Air Force, now
shorn of its ground support, lost 29 MIG fighter planes in one day,
without a single Israeli loss. It was the most intensive, concentrated air
battle known to that date: 200 planes from both sides grappling within a
"box" of 50x50 kms. This was the result of lessons learned after the
Yom Kippur War - a combination of training and equipment, planning
and control, surprise and inventiveness, among which secret means of
electronic warfare took pride of place. This war, therefore, may be
characterized as that of Electronic Warfare.
Meanwhile, daily ambushes against Israeli occupying forces increased,
with a corresponding increase in casualties - 1,216 soldiers killed
between 5 June 1982 and 31 May 1985. One of its first and most
important victims was the national consensus. For the first time in the
history of Israel not only was the conduct of war debated - for this there
had been ample precedent - but the very justification of the war. The
Prime Minister, Menahem Begin, himself provided the watchword: a War
of Choice, unlike all previous wars, which were perceived as dire
necessities.
The failure of Operation Peace of Galilee to achieve its objective
prevailed upon the new national coalition government, which took office
in 1984, to withdraw forthwith from Lebanon. A token force was left
behind, to help the citizens of south Lebanon to patrol the Security Zone
- a narrow strip of territory adjacent to Israel's border, which was an
essential tripwire for Israeli settlements, some of which are located next
to the border.
The towns and villages along the northern border were on the whole
relatively safe - with some notable exceptions. Katyusha attacks
concentrated on Kiryat Shmona in July 1993, provoked Israel to
undertake Operation Din Veheshbon, a major raid into Lebanon, and
again in April 1995, to mount Operation Grapes of Wrath. The latter was
a "clean" operation, with no Israeli casualties; but its effect was marred
by Israeli artillery mistakenly bombarding a camp near a UN base in Kafr
Kana, resulting in the death of almost a hundred civilians. Following that
operation a Joint Monitoring Machinery was established, including US,
French, Syrian, Lebanese and Israeli representatives to watch over the
implementation of a number of basic "understandings" - first amongst
them the prohibition of unprovoked attacks against civilian populations
and utilizing such populations as cover and shield for military units.
Meanwhile, attacks - mainly by members of Hizballah (Party of God), a
fanatic Shi'ite sect supported by Iran and tolerated, at least, by Syria -
against Israeli and South Lebanese Forces in the Security Zone
continue unabated.
 
In December 1987 Palestinian Arabs embarked on the intifada (literally
awakening), which was to keep the IDF occupied for the coming three
years. It entailed a great deal of patrolling of Arab population centers;
daily clashes with stone-throwing groups of youngsters, often barely in
their teens. It did not present a military problem, but a moral one. The
IDF was under strict orders to open live fire only in a situation of real
danger to life. What was one to do with a mere boy, throwing a stone? It
was a most distasteful task for a citizen army trained for warfare and
tested the army's morale to the utmost.
The intifada, however troublesome, was never allowed to divert
attention from the main task: preparing for another round. Peace with
Egypt was relatively secure - a "cold peace", but peace all the same.
Jordan was anxious, for very good reasons of its own, to maintain quiet
along the border with Israel, the longest between Israel and any of its
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neighbors. Syria was considered the most hostile, and the IDF had to
prepare for the day it would achieve "strategic parity" with Israel.
But then the eight-year long Iraq-Iran War ended and Saddam Hussein
openly declared his readiness, even his eagerness, to put his forces at
the disposal of the Palestinian cause. This would automatically
guarantee Iraq leadership of the Arab world. Although it had no common
border with Israel, Iraq had participated in most of the wars against the
Jewish state.
Even before the war with Iran ended, the IAF - in one more spectacular
and precise raid - Operation Tamuz - took out the Iraqi nuclear plant
Osirak, which, established with French assistance, had come close to
the production of a nuclear device. Israel was condemned by the
Security Council.
The Gulf War (1991)
After the end of his war with Iran, Saddam Hussein had a huge,
battlewise army sitting idle and his threats to "burn half of Israel" had to
be taken seriously. The IDF was concerned at the availability to
Saddam Hussein of considerable quantities of Russian-made Scud
missiles with a range of 600 kms., against which no effective
countermeasure was as yet in Israel's arsenal; particularly if those
missiles were to be equipped with chemical warheads, which Saddam
was reputed to have perfected with the help of German companies.
 
  A "safe" room
during a Scud
attack
 
At the urging of the US, which was concerned that it might be deserted
by its Arab coalition partners, Israel refrained from active participation in
the war.
In view of the unprecedented danger to the civilian rear, special
attention was paid to its organization: the IDF was responsible for the
procurement and distribution of gas masks to the entire population; it
readied the medical aid network; and instructed the population in
preparing "safe rooms" for use in case the alarm was sounded.
For Israel, this war was characterized as the War of the Civilian Rear,
and the Gadna, the Youth Batallions, once more had a useful role to
play, which they faithfully carried out.
 
    
Conclusions
1947-49; 1956; 1967; 1973; 1982; 1991: at almost regular intervals the
IDF has been faced with a major, violent outburst. Will this continue into
the indefinite future? "Shall the sword devour for ever?" (Samuel II,
2:23).
The price was enormous for a small country. A total of 20,093 soldiers
fell in action up to the end of March 1997.
The outlook is not entirely bleak. Slowly but surely, the world has come
to recognise Israel's right to exist: in November 1917 it was one lonely
power - Great Britain - which issued the Balfour Declaration; in
November 1947, after an interval of thirty years, a large majority of the
United Nations voted in favor of the Partition Resolution, but not one
Arab or Moslem country among them; and in November 1977, after
another thirty years, President Sadat of Egypt came to Jerusalem and
from the rostrum of the Knesset declared that his country was willing to
live in peace with Israel.
On 30 October 1991 a Peace Conference, co-sponsored by the US and
the USSR, was convened in Madrid. It was followed - after two years of
secret negotiations - by the signing of a Declaration of Principles
between Israel and the PLO, marking a significant step towards
conciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. Next came the
Gaza-Jericho Agreement of May 1994 and subsequent agreements
detailing the gradual handing-over to the Palestinian Authority of more
territory and more responsibilities.
The Madrid Conference also opened the way to negotiations
culminating in the Treaty of Peace with the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, signed by prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Abdul Salam
Majali on 26 October 1994. Israel also established relations - primarily
commercial relations - with several Arab countries in the Persian Gulf
dN t hA fi
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Thus the peace process has progressed over the years; but as long as
some countries - and not only Israel's immediate neighbors - refuse to
recognize its rightful existence, the possibility of war cannot be ignored
and the IDF - Israel's guardian and shield - "shall neither slumber nor
sleep." (Psalms 121:4).
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